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Soft power may be the UK government’s best option to
promote trade and civil liberties in the Gulf states
The UK’s relationship with the Persian Gulf has undergone many changes in its over 200-
year history. Now, the British government under the coalition is focused on building closer
trading ties, whilst at the same time encouraging greater civil liberties in the Gulf. Nima
Khorrami Assl argues that both of these objectives are best served by the UK’s formal and
informal networks of advisers and diplomats.
Faced with a lack of resources and public appetite for an interventionist foreign policy,
economic austerity and stagnation at home, and a rapidly changing geopolitical
environment, Britain’s foreign policy has undergone radical changes since the election of the
coalition government. Today, expansion of ties with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states – “those countries whose growth rates show the greatest promise” as William Hague
puts it – takes the central stage in Britain’s diplomatic agenda with a special focus on commercial diplomacy,
promotion of civil rights, and tackling climate change.
The UK is no stranger to the Persian Gulf sub region. It has had a presence in that part of the world since
the late 18th Century, and it also played a significant role in the establishment of modern state
infrastructures in the Gulf Sheikhdoms over the course of the 20th Century. As Gulf cities expanded, many of
the new buildings, airports, bridges, and facilities were designed by British firms like Halcrow. Equally
important was the role played by the British Council in the early development of secondary education in the
Gulf Sheikhdoms.
Concerned with high unemployment rates, social instability, and their exposure to the global financial
meltdown, the six members of the GCC have accelerated, albeit to various extent, their moves towards the
establishment of knowledge-based economies, financial sector reform, modern infrastructure development,
and indeed civil society building. Such initiatives, in turn, have provided Britain with a window of opportunity
to secure its new foreign policy objectives with greater ease in this critical part of the globe. Although her
power is in wane, Britain nonetheless possesses many of the qualities and characteristics needed to help the
GCC states in realising their long-term national goals.
The ever increasing instances of official visits and trade delegation exchanges between London and the sub
region are evidence of this. Notwithstanding fierce competition from rising Asian powers, the British
government is optimistic that it will be able to sign lucrative deals with the Gulf Monarchies because,
according to a Gulf official, the strong presence of Britons in “senior positions as old and trusted friends
whose loyalties to our rulers have been proven” provides London with an advantage that no other country
can wish for.
Interestingly, the British government can pursue its other foreign policy objective – promotion of civil liberties
– by seeking to utilise this network of British advisors. Things do move slowly in the GCC, but support for
“managed change and transition” is high on the governments’ agendas evident in recent elections held in
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At the same time, public dissatisfaction, excluding Bahrain, does not seem to be
at a boiling point with the majority of Gulf citizens still having high respects for their rulers. Given the
conservative political culture of the subregion and a widely-held belief that “key decisions are made privately
not in the open”, Britain, with its own transitional experience from a monarchical system to a parliamentary
democracy, stands a better chance of achieving the normative side of her foreign policy by using ‘British
advisors’ as a valuable back channel of communication on the sensitive issue of political reform.
All in all, the British government could substantially benefit from pursuing the parallel strategy of informal and
formal diplomacy in the sub region of Persian Gulf. Simultaneously, London has to be prepared to “take on
board” Arab foreign policy goals seeing expansion of ties as a “two-way street”. This, in turn, requires the
government to take into account the “undercurrents, trends and challenges” facing the GCC states rather
than “calculations about U.S. capabilities and the ‘special relationship’”.
